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JUDICIAL NON-RESTRAINT AS A REMEDY
FOR JUDICIAL NON-RESTRAINT
ALLAN AXELROD "I
If judges were to be taken at their word, and if newspapers cared
a little more about judges, the Mendel opinion would have gotten
headlines: "High Court Blasts Juries"; "N.Y. Trial Judges Scored";
"Most Product Injury Claims Fake, Says Scileppi."
The headlines would be justified, even though the Mendel opinion
confines its blasts to the cases which WOULD be brought (and im-
properly decided) if the Court of Appeals accepted a statute of limita-
tions permitting commencement of product-liability actions more than
six years after sale. The opinion states that injuries more than six years
after sale are mostly from causes beyond the manufacturer's responsibil-
ity. And how does the Court know that this class of injuries for which
the manufacturer is not liable will be converted into judgments for
which he is? The link can only be supplied by an assessment of the
moral character of New York's injured citizens and plaintiffs' bar, and
of the quality of inferior court judicial decision.
When a state's highest court speaks to the ethics of its people, and
the competence of its courts, it is unseemly to disagree. However, all
this is mere policy, and the decision, though touching on such policy,
is rested on legal analysis. Whether the analysis of the majority is
sounder than that of the dissent has been adequately mooted elsewhere
in this issue. But I'm looking forward to the majority's decision in a
case which I hope will soon be before it.
It will be one of a series of daily actions against General Motors for
breach of implied warranty brought by a plaintiffs' class consisting, at
least, of everyone in the State of New York. The complaint will allege
that on the previous day, such and such a number of G.M. cars were
sold in the State, and that on information and belief such and such a
number of those cars were defective. Having thus established its
Mendel cause of action (sale of a defective article creates a stranger's
cause of action on contract), the complaint will then pray damages. Six
cents a head for each defective car will do for starters; but there must be
some damages formula implicit in the Mendel opinion, though I
haven't quite worked it out.
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